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ON APPEAL TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION,
Petitioner and Appellant,
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
vs.

CaseNo.20000965-CA
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
G. Edward Leary, Commissioner,

Priority No. 14

Respondent and Appellee.

Petitioner and Appellant America First Credit Union responds to Appellee Department
of Financial Institution's Brief as follows:
I.

The Utah Credit Union Act Restricts Only Direct Loans to Members as
Member-Business Loans, And Specifically Regulates Loan Participations
Differently From Member-Business Loans.
The Utah Credit Union Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-9-3 through 7-9-54 (the Credit Union

Act), permits credit unions to directly loan money only to members, while expressly regulating
loan participations differently. Loan participations are not direct member loans and are thus not
subject to member loan restrictions unless the originating lender is a credit union. Simply put,

if credit union member-business loans and credit union loan participations were really the same
thing, as the Department of Financial Institutions ("Department") suggests, there would be no
need for specifically regulating or authorizing loan participations as is done under the Credit
Union Act.
As the Department acknowledges, loan participations are arrangements for the sale or
purchase of part of a loan where the acquiring institution has no formal or direct role in
establishing the credit with the individual borrower. The acquiring institution does not lend
funds to an individual borrower. Rather, it purchases an interest in a loan already made by
another institution. The transaction is solely between two or more financial institutions. Thus,
when the originating institution is not a credit union, the loan is not at any time a credit union
member loan and cannot be regulated as a credit union member loan.
The Department fails to explain how a bank loan to a long time customer becomes a
credit union member-business loan when the credit union did not originate the loan and has no
contact with the individual borrower. The Credit Union Act limits credit unions' direct lending
authority to lending money only to their members. However, the restrictions apply only to
direct loans. It is beyond the reach of the Credit Union Act to transform direct loans by banks
into credit union loans regulated under the Credit Union Act.
The Credit Union Act restricts loans by a credit union to members only and caps loan
amounts. In particular, ua credit union may not extend a member-business loan to a person"
unless that person has been a member for at least six months and the loan amounts meet are
within the statutory limits. Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-20(7)(b)(ii) (emphasis added). The fair
application of this restriction reaches only to direct loans actually extended by a credit union.
"Extend" in this context requires a direct act of a credit union in originating a loan. This active
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language identifies the restricted conduct as the act of loaning money directly to a member of
the credit union for a business purpose, i.e. originating a member-business loan. Even the
Department implies such direct activity in its description of the Credit Union Act, noting the
Act's "limitations on credit union loans being issued only to members." (Appellee Brief at
page 13) (emphasis added).
Conversely, participations in loans originated by non-credit union institutions are not
direct loans by a credit union, and are thus not restricted in the same manner as member loans.
Rather, the credit to a person has been directly issued by a bank, with no direct involvement by
the credit union. The participation transaction is strictly between two financial institutions. It
would be nonsensical to apply membership requirements to a borrower with whom the credit
union has no business relationship: The credit union did not sign the loan, did not negotiate the
loan with the borrower, does not service or collect the loan, and has no direct contact with the
borrower. In sum, the credit union has no business relationship with the borrower.
Instead, the credit union's business relationship is solely with the bank. The credit
union purchased only an interest in a loan as an investment, expecting a return on its money.
The bank originated the loan, and bears the continuing responsibility of servicing, monitoring
and collecting the loan. Because a credit union did not issue a direct loan, the loan cannot be
regulated as a direct member-business loan. Such a bank loan cannot be transformed into a
member-business loan because only one institution, the bank, has originated the loan to a
specific borrower, and only the bank maintains a business relationship with that borrower.
By focusing on direct loans to individuals, the Department draws attention away from
the real issue of statutory credit union authority to enter loan participations with non-credit
unionfinancialinstitutions. These are different matters—loan participations cannot be equated

with direct loans to individuals. If credit union loans and credit union loan participations were
identical, with member-business loan regulations applying to both, then the statutory language
regarding participations would be superfluous.
Courts avoid interpretations which render parts or words in a statute "inoperative or
superfluous." State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995); see also Reedeker v. Salisbury.
952 P.2d 577, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Here, equating credit union loan participations with
direct credit union loans would render specific statutory provisions superfluous, and thus such
an interpretation is inappropriate. For example, if every credit union loan participation is a
member-business loan as the Department asserts, then section 7-9-20(7)(f)(ii) would be
inoperative and superfluous. Section 7-9-20(7)(f)(ii) provides:
For a member-business loan that is extended through a loan participation
agreement in accordance with Subsection 7-9-5(12):
(ii) the requirement of Subsection (7)(b)(ii)(A) [providing for six month
membership requirement] applies to membership in any credit union that participates in
the loan participation arrangement for the member-business loan.
Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-20(7)(f)(ii).
Two key points are apparent from this statutory language. First, the statutory language
does not broadly apply this section to every credit union participation, but instead narrowly
states its target. Member-business loans, i.e. those originated by a credit union, are expressly
identified as the target of this loan participation regulation. This specific language indicates
that member-business loans offered for participation are limited by this provision, and implies
that there are other loans that could be offered for credit union participation without falling
under this restriction. The "expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of
another." Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 1101J14, 993 P.2d 875. Because
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section 7-9-20(7)(f) expressly identifies member-business loans as the statutory target, loans
originating from other sources should be excluded from this statutory limitation.
Furthermore, if all credit union loan participations were to be subject to this section,
which is the outcome under the Department's interpretation, then the express identification of
member-business loans as the statutory target would be inoperative and superfluous. To give
this specific statutory language effect, the specification of member-business loans as the target
of the limitation should operate to exclude loans originating from banks from this restriction.
Any other interpretation would render this section superfluous, and would thus be inappropriate
under the rules of statutory construction.
Second, this section expressly applies the credit union six month membership
requirement to the specific loan participations identified in this section, those originating as
member-business loans. Once again, to give this section effect, the membership restrictions
must apply only to participations in credit union originated loans. Under the Department's
interpretation, all member-business loan regulations already apply to all credit union loan
participations regardless of the loan origin. If this interpretation is effective, then there would
be no need to expressly apply the membership requirement to "any credit union that participates
in the loan participation arrangement for the member-business loan" originated by another
credit union. The membership requirements would apply independently, making this restriction
redundant. The Department's interpretation is clearly inappropriate given the plain statutory
language of this section, expressly targeting loans originated by a credit union.
The Department's interpretation that any credit union loan participation is a
member-business loan makes section 7-9-20(7)(f) inoperative and superfluous. If all credit
union loan participations were indeed member-business loans, no specific regulation of credit

union participations would be necessary because such participations would be fully regulated as
member-business loans. This interpretation is untenable under the plain language and structure
of the Credit Union Act. The trial court erred in concluding that all credit union loan
participations are member-business loans under the statute, and should be reversed.
II.

Loan Participations Are Investments Within the Scope of the Credit Union Act.
AFCU entered into a loan participation as an approved form of investment within the

meaning of "investment" in the Credit Union Act. Section 7-9-26 authorizes the appointment
of investment officers to take responsibility for the credit union investment portfolio in
accordance with policies established by the board of directors. See Utah Code Ann. §
7-9-26(2). Additionally, this section lists categories of investments in which credit unions may
place their funds. See id. § 7-9-26(3). Included types of investments are securities, obligations
or other instruments issued or guaranteed by the government, loans of particular types, shares or
stocks of certain types, and "other investments that are reasonable and prudent." Id. Loan
participations are "other investments that are reasonable and prudent."
Although the Department asserts that loan participations are strictly loans, participations
are not exclusively loans for all purposes. Participations originate as loans, and remain loans
from the perspective of the direct lender, because a direct loan is made to a specific borrower.
However, from the perspective of the acquiring institution, loan participations are a type of
investment. Essentially, it is the purchase of a narrow portfolio evaluated for performance by
both the originating institution and by the acquiring institution. A participating financial
institution buys into a loan for the return on funds without the administrative responsibilities of
negotiating, originating, or servicing the loan. A loan participation is an investment because it
is a purchase with the expectation of a profitable return on the money invested. Under the
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Credit Union Act, the only requirement for such an investment is that it be reasonable and
prudent.
The Department argues that "investments" must be securities to qualify as investments
under section 7-9-26(3), and because loan participations are not securities, they are not
investments. However, the Department has inverted the meaning of the terms: securities are a
subset of investment, not the other way around. There is nothing in the Credit Union Act to
indicate that credit union investments must be securities, and in fact, the plain language
indicates otherwise.
The Credit Union Act clearly contemplates investments other than securities. First,
there is simply no language of restriction indicating all investments by credit unions must be
securities. On the contrary, the statute leaves investment policies primarily to the discretion of
the board of directors. See Utah Code Ann. § 7-9-26(2).
Second, the plain language of the Credit Union Act expressly permits other types of
investments. See id. § 7-9-26(3). The listed types of permissible investments include types
other than securities, such as government bonds, certificates of deposit, and loans. See id.
Additionally, it is clear this list is simply for example purposes, because of the broad authority
granted in the residual "other investments that are reasonable and prudent." LI Given the
language and structure of the Credit Union Act, the assertion that loan participations are not
investments because they are not securities is misguided.
Loan participations are not securities. See Payable Accounting Corp. v. McKinley, 667
P.2d 15, 20 (Utah 1983). They are investments. See id. Even the Department acknowledges
that the loan participation agreement at issue here "could be considered an investment in the
generic sense." See Appellee Brief page 20. This generic sense is all that is necessary under

the Credit Union Act. "Investments" permitted under the Credit Union Act are broad, including
at the broadest point "other investments that are reasonable and prudent." Utah Code Ann. §
7-9-26(3)(f).
Furthermore, the cases cited by the Department do not propose that loan participations
are not investments. Each of the cases used by the Department to support its assertion that
participations are not investments support only the narrower proposition that participations are
not securities; they go no further. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 110 S. Ct. 945
(1990); Payable Accounting Corp., 667 P.2d 15; Developer's Mortgage Co. v. Transohio Sav.
Bank, 706 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Ohio 1989). Each of these cases evaluated only whether a
particular transaction or document was a security within the scope of securities laws, thus
bringing securities regulation to bear.
For example, the family resemblance test noted by the Department is a mechanism to
determine whether a particular investment is a security. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 67, 110 S.Ct. at
952. The test does not, however, define investment. The term investment is much broader. In
fact, the Court noted that the fundamental essence of a security is its character as an investment,
demonstrating that investment is indeed a much broader category. See id. at 68, 110 S.Ct. at
953. Thus, the Department's assertion that a loan participation is not a security and therefore is
not an investment is incorrect. The loan participation is not a security, but it is an investment.
Furthermore, the Department argues that because the term "loan" is used to describe this
particular investment, it therefore is a loan for all purposes. However, as noted above, a loan
participation originates as a loan, but is an investment from the perspective of the acquiring
institution. Its character is as an investment rather than a loan, because it is a purchase of an
interest with an expected rate of return on the money. Simply having a fixed rate of interest
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does not diminish the character as an investment, where an investor puts money at risk with an
expectation of return. See, e.g., Payable Accounting Corp., 667 P.2d at 19. Additionally,
courts are not bound by the labels placed on contracts, and instead look to the substance of the
contract or transaction. See id. at 18. The substance of the participation here from the credit
union's perspective is an investment, regardless of the term "loan" used in an applicable rule, or
the term participation used on the documents.
Overall, the loan participation is an investment within the scope of the Credit Union
Act, particularly from the perspective of the acquiring institution. Loan participations are not
strictly loans for all purposes.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and Petitioner and Appellant's initial brief, this Court should
reverse the Second District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, and
determine that the loan participation agreement between AFCU and Holladay Bank is
appropriate and complies with the Credit Union Act.
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